Analysis by Cleophus Thomas III
August 14, 2013
According to the March 2013 UN Security Council resolution re-authorising the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM),
the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) and other foreign troops must
co-ordinate with the Somali federal government to "reduce the threat
posed by al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups […] to establish
conditions for effective and legitimate governance in Somalia".
However, Kenya's support of Ahmed Mohamed Islam Madobe's Ras Kamboni
militia and his Jubbaland political administration amid armed clan
conflict and disagreement over the local government's legitimacy has
sparked debate about whether the KDF should be supplemented or replaced
by "more neutral" multi-lateral forces.
While Kenya has been blamed for exacerbating the crisis, the Somali parliament, administration and army all have key roles in not providing an optimal environment to coordinate efforts with the KDF -- pointing to the need for a more comprehensive solution to the crisis in Kismayo.
After the KDF and Ras Kamboni ousted al-Shabaab from Kismayo in September 2012, Kenyan officials in May 2013 lauded the conference that united the regions of Gedo, Lower Jubba, and Middle Jubba under Jubbaland and elected Madobe as president, stating the process was constitutional and a positive step in long-term regional stability.
However, the Somali government stated the conference was unconstitutional because it did not involve all local parties and the federal government -- an issue that highlights an ongoing disagreement over the rights granted in the country's ambiguous constitution.
In spite of this row, the KDF has continued to support Ras Kamboni in Kismayo, and its controversial treatment of a federal delegation sent to Kismayo in May, as well as its alleged role in exporting charcoal illegally with Madobe's forces, have brought up questions whether it is acting outside of its mandate and international and local laws.
The charcoal allegation affirms worries that Kenya is seeking connections with local actors to gain influence over the extraction of natural resources in Somalia.
Worries over access to Somalia's resources have been especially high since 2009 when Kenya signed a controversial agreement with Somalia's then Transitional Federal Government stating that there were no objections between the two countries to submit their respective views to the UN regarding disputed outer limits to the continental shelf. The memorandum, which has ramifications for offshore oil exploitation, was later nullified by the Somali Transitional Parliament and more recently by Somalia's current government.
Overall, Kenya's direct support to Ras Kamboni has put it squarely on one side of a complex armed and political conflict between rival militias and clans that feel marginalized by Madobe's Jubbaland administration. The KDF's role has continued to be one of many contributing factors to tensions in Kismayo and likely represents a conflict of interest since the KDF comprise a majority of AMISOM's security forces in the city.
To allay these concerns, AMISOM recently stated it intended to deploy a "multi-lateral" force in Kismayo and ensure that control over the airport and seaport were to be transferred to the federal government. But, Kenya's reluctance to transfer control of the ports without a negotiated settlement between the federal government and Ras Kamboni shows that the realities of alliances and influences on the ground will continue to have primacy over statements by regional and federal authorities.
Since taking office, the Somali parliament has failed to carry out its constitutional duties to nominate a federal commission to research the federalism issue as part of the overall process to determine the number of federal member states and the roles local and federal actors would have in establishing them.
Similarly, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and his cabinet have not articulated a specific vision and process for how federalism could be implemented in the country.
In regard to Kismayo, there are ongoing talks behind the scenes in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia between Jubbaland and Somali officials, but this falls short of President Mohamud's proposed plans to seek a negotiated solution through a reconciliation conference including all local parties.
These shortcomings have continued to fuel sentiments that the Somali parliament remains paralyzed and that the Mohamud administration seeks to maximize its authority rather than share power in a federal Somalia.
On the security side, the lack of a unified and coherent Somali National Army (SNA) has prevented the KDF from having a reliable national military partner. The federal government has admitted that many clan militias operating in the Kismayo area do not fall under the SNA's command, and some militias, such as the one led by another Jubbaland presidential claimant Barre Adam Shire Hirale, have reportedly flirted with an alliance with al-Shabaab in order to fight Ras Kamboni.
While Kenya's support to Ras Kamboni is a product of its own interests and objectives, the Somali federal government could make a stronger case for the KDF to enhance cooperation with the SNA if it succeeded in solidifying its own ranks and clarifying its relationship with other militias in the area. Until this is done, it could be more difficult for the Somali government to direct better coordination with its troops and the KDF in Kismayo.
It is in the best interest of stability in the region for local and regional parties to reach a cessation of conflict and continue to work toward a political settlement.
Until such co-operation and reconciliation is sought out, armed and political conflict in Kismayo will likely continue, regardless of the KDF's presence.
The offensive against al-Shabaab, which has stalled for months in Lower and Middle Jubba, will also continue to experience difficulties as the Kismayo crisis lingers and provides a safe haven for al-Shabaab to stage attacks across the country.
Equally concerning, the ongoing absence of a consensus over a national plan for how to implement federalism has set the stage for future conflicts similar to the one in Kismayo, as local groups in other areas of Somalia begin to organise to form federal states.
Many observers look to Mogadishu as a barometer for Somalia's recovery. However, Kismayo represents another important indicator of key issues that will determine the direction of the country. In this way, Kismayo will continue to test if the Somali and Kenyan governments can work together with local parties and its regional partners to lead Somalia forward.
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The port of Kismayo as seen from the air on October 4, 2012. Two days earlier, Somali National Army troops, the Ras Kamboni militia and the African Union Mission in Somalia entered Kismayo after wresting the city from al-Shabaab control. [Stuart Price/AU-UN IST/AFP]
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A Kenyan Air Force helicopter lands at Kismayo Airport on October 12th, 2012. [Stuart Price/AU-UN IST/AFP]
![The port of Kismayo as seen from the air on October 4, 2012. Two days earlier, Somali National Army troops, the Ras Kamboni militia and the African Union Mission in Somalia entered Kismayo after wresting the city from al-Shabaab control. [Stuart Price/AU-UN IST/AFP]](http://sabahionline.com/shared/images/2013/08/14/somalia-kismayo-port.jpg)
![A Kenyan Air Force helicopter lands at Kismayo Airport on October 12th, 2012. [Stuart Price/AU-UN IST/AFP]](http://sabahionline.com/shared/images/2013/08/14/somalia-kismayo-kenya.jpg)
While Kenya has been blamed for exacerbating the crisis, the Somali parliament, administration and army all have key roles in not providing an optimal environment to coordinate efforts with the KDF -- pointing to the need for a more comprehensive solution to the crisis in Kismayo.
Role and motivations of the KDF
Currently, the KDF reportedly has approximately 4,652 troops in Somalia under AMISOM. It is responsible for Sector II operations with Sierra Leone in Lower and Middle Jubba.After the KDF and Ras Kamboni ousted al-Shabaab from Kismayo in September 2012, Kenyan officials in May 2013 lauded the conference that united the regions of Gedo, Lower Jubba, and Middle Jubba under Jubbaland and elected Madobe as president, stating the process was constitutional and a positive step in long-term regional stability.
However, the Somali government stated the conference was unconstitutional because it did not involve all local parties and the federal government -- an issue that highlights an ongoing disagreement over the rights granted in the country's ambiguous constitution.
In spite of this row, the KDF has continued to support Ras Kamboni in Kismayo, and its controversial treatment of a federal delegation sent to Kismayo in May, as well as its alleged role in exporting charcoal illegally with Madobe's forces, have brought up questions whether it is acting outside of its mandate and international and local laws.
The charcoal allegation affirms worries that Kenya is seeking connections with local actors to gain influence over the extraction of natural resources in Somalia.
Worries over access to Somalia's resources have been especially high since 2009 when Kenya signed a controversial agreement with Somalia's then Transitional Federal Government stating that there were no objections between the two countries to submit their respective views to the UN regarding disputed outer limits to the continental shelf. The memorandum, which has ramifications for offshore oil exploitation, was later nullified by the Somali Transitional Parliament and more recently by Somalia's current government.
Overall, Kenya's direct support to Ras Kamboni has put it squarely on one side of a complex armed and political conflict between rival militias and clans that feel marginalized by Madobe's Jubbaland administration. The KDF's role has continued to be one of many contributing factors to tensions in Kismayo and likely represents a conflict of interest since the KDF comprise a majority of AMISOM's security forces in the city.
To allay these concerns, AMISOM recently stated it intended to deploy a "multi-lateral" force in Kismayo and ensure that control over the airport and seaport were to be transferred to the federal government. But, Kenya's reluctance to transfer control of the ports without a negotiated settlement between the federal government and Ras Kamboni shows that the realities of alliances and influences on the ground will continue to have primacy over statements by regional and federal authorities.
Shortcomings of Somali government and military
Despite criticisms of Kenya's actions in Kismayo, the shortcomings of Somalia's parliament, government and security forces have had an impact on the ability of the KDF to fulfil its mandate effectively.Since taking office, the Somali parliament has failed to carry out its constitutional duties to nominate a federal commission to research the federalism issue as part of the overall process to determine the number of federal member states and the roles local and federal actors would have in establishing them.
Similarly, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and his cabinet have not articulated a specific vision and process for how federalism could be implemented in the country.
In regard to Kismayo, there are ongoing talks behind the scenes in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia between Jubbaland and Somali officials, but this falls short of President Mohamud's proposed plans to seek a negotiated solution through a reconciliation conference including all local parties.
These shortcomings have continued to fuel sentiments that the Somali parliament remains paralyzed and that the Mohamud administration seeks to maximize its authority rather than share power in a federal Somalia.
On the security side, the lack of a unified and coherent Somali National Army (SNA) has prevented the KDF from having a reliable national military partner. The federal government has admitted that many clan militias operating in the Kismayo area do not fall under the SNA's command, and some militias, such as the one led by another Jubbaland presidential claimant Barre Adam Shire Hirale, have reportedly flirted with an alliance with al-Shabaab in order to fight Ras Kamboni.
While Kenya's support to Ras Kamboni is a product of its own interests and objectives, the Somali federal government could make a stronger case for the KDF to enhance cooperation with the SNA if it succeeded in solidifying its own ranks and clarifying its relationship with other militias in the area. Until this is done, it could be more difficult for the Somali government to direct better coordination with its troops and the KDF in Kismayo.
Kismayo and the future of Somalia
Al-Shabaab remains in control of large parts of Jubbaland, and no one group has a monopoly of power and influence in the remaining areas. Therefore, security in Kismayo and Jubbaland cannot be achieved through piecemeal alliances on behalf of Kenya, Somalia or other actors.It is in the best interest of stability in the region for local and regional parties to reach a cessation of conflict and continue to work toward a political settlement.
Until such co-operation and reconciliation is sought out, armed and political conflict in Kismayo will likely continue, regardless of the KDF's presence.
The offensive against al-Shabaab, which has stalled for months in Lower and Middle Jubba, will also continue to experience difficulties as the Kismayo crisis lingers and provides a safe haven for al-Shabaab to stage attacks across the country.
Equally concerning, the ongoing absence of a consensus over a national plan for how to implement federalism has set the stage for future conflicts similar to the one in Kismayo, as local groups in other areas of Somalia begin to organise to form federal states.
Many observers look to Mogadishu as a barometer for Somalia's recovery. However, Kismayo represents another important indicator of key issues that will determine the direction of the country. In this way, Kismayo will continue to test if the Somali and Kenyan governments can work together with local parties and its regional partners to lead Somalia forward.
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